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LAWRENCE ROSEN, LAW AS CULTURE: AN INVITATION (Princeton 
Univ. Press, 2006) AND OSCAR G. CHASE, LAW, CULTURE, AND RITUAL: 
DISPUTING SYSTEMS IN CROSS-CULTURAL CONTEXT (New York Univ. 
Press, 2005) 
Reviewed by Paul Schiff Berman* 
 
THE ENDURING CONNECTIONS BETWEEN LAW AND CULTURE 
In an era of globalization, “culture’’ is sometimes treated as a 
dirty word. For those who see the world as increasingly “flat,”1 
culture can seem to be merely a retrograde imposition of local 
prerogative that stands in the way of progress.2 Likewise, those who 
seek greater harmonization of human rights norms, commercial 
trade rules, or other legal standards may view culture as simply a 
monkey wrench in the machinery of global consensus and 
cooperation.3 In such debates, culture is often conceptualized as 
fundamentally pre-modern, something “they” cling to, but that “we” 
have long since jettisoned.4 
 
* Dean and Foundation Professor of Law, Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law, 
Arizona State University. I owe thanks to Gosia Zawislak for editorial and research 
assistance. 
 1. See, e.g., THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE WORLD IS FLAT: A BRIEF HISTORY OF 
THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2005). 
 2. See, e.g., Lawrence E. Harrison, Introduction: Why Culture Matters, in 
CULTURE MATTERS: HOW VALUES SHAPE HUMAN PROGRESS xxi (Lawrence E. 
Harrison & Samuel P. Huntington eds., 2000) (“A growing number of scholars, 
journalists, politicians, and development practitioners are focusing on the role of 
cultural values and attitudes as facilitators of, or obstacles to, progress.”); Pratibha 
Jain, Balancing Minority Rights and Gender Justice: The Impact of Protecting 
Multiculturalism on Women’s Rights in India, 23 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 201, 207 
(2005) (“We ought to ensure that multiculturalist notions conform to universal 
human rights norms . . . .”); cf. Jean-Michel Servais, Universal Labor Standards and 
National Cultures, 26 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 35, 47 (2004) (criticizing the notion 
“that some cultures are more open to progress than others [and] that cultural 
diversity will inevitably lead to opposition on questions of values and even 
constitutes an obstacle to development” but acknowledging the premise “that being 
too respectful of national considerations can lead to failure”). 
 3. See, e.g., José A. Laínez & Mar Gasca, Obstacles to the Harmonisation 
Process in the European Union: The Influence of Culture, 3 INT’L J. ACCOUNTING, 
AUDITING & PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 68 (2006), available at 
http://inderscience.metapress.com/media/mftkvluwmj1d367rvvtk/contributions/3/1/a/
t/31at8fuht2tja3xt.pdf. 
 4. See, e.g., Mary Douglas, Traditional Culture—Let’s Hear No More About It, 
in CULTURE AND PUBLIC ACTION 85, 87 (Vijayendra Rao & Michael Walton eds., 
2004) (describing belief of development economists that “something called ‘culture’ is 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1409294
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Two recent books—Law as Culture by Lawrence Rosen and 
Law, Culture, and Ritual by Oscar Chase—provide a welcome 
response to this “anti-culture” bias. Both works point to the enduring 
claims of culture as the necessary and inevitable mechanism by 
which human beings construct meaning out of reality. Indeed, the 
capacity for culture is seen as a crucial part of our very evolution as 
a species.5 Thus, culture is not simply a set of customs we can choose 
to put on or take off like clothing; it is woven into the fabric of our 
being. Accordingly, cosmopolitans no less than localists are using 
cultural categories, reflecting cultural assumptions, and betraying 
cultural presuppositions. 
Moreover, as both books make clear, law and culture cannot be 
disentangled. Rather, as Rosen points out, “law is so deeply 
embedded in the particularities of each culture that carving it out as 
a separate domain and only later making note of its cultural 
connections distorts the nature of both law and culture” (Rosen, p. 
xii). From this perspective, we must not see law as simply an 
autonomous system of rules that regulates disputes. Law is instead 
constitutive of how members of a society envision themselves and 
their relations to each other. 6 
Because of the ongoing importance of culture, we should not be 
surprised that efforts to harmonize both substantive norms and 
procedural systems run into difficulty on the ground. This is not 
news to comparative lawyers, of course, given their consistent efforts 
to conceptualize and categorize differences among legal systems. Yet, 
 
the adversary of rational economic behavior, and that ‘traditional culture’ [is] holding 
the poor nations back from development”); Diana Ayton-Shenker, The Challenge of 
Human Rights and Cultural Diversity, UNITED NATIONS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC 
INFORMATION (1995), http://www.un.org/rights/dpi1627e.htm (contrasting universal 
human rights, conceptualized as “a modern achievement, new to all cultures” with 
“traditional culture,” which may not effectively provide such rights). 
 5. See Rosen at 3: “[Human beings’] categorizing capacity—the key feature of 
the concept of ‘culture’—was not something that happened after we became human 
but something that actually preceded our present speciation. Thus, the acquisition of 
the capacity for culture, through the selective advantage it offered, contributed 
enormously to our evolution into homo sapiens.” 
 6. This perspective echoes the formulation of Clifford Geertz: 
[L]aw, rather than a mere technical add-on to a morally (or immorally) 
finished society, is, along of course with a whole range of other cultural 
realities . . . an active part of it. . . . Law . . . is, in a word, constructive; in 
another, constitutive; in a third, formational. 
. . . . 
. . . Law, with its power to place particular things that happen . . . in a general 
frame in such a way that rules for the principled management of them seem to 
arise naturally from the essentials of their character, is rather more than a 
reflection of received wisdom or a technology of dispute settlement. 
Clifford Geertz, Local Knowledge: Fact and Law in Comparative Perspective, in 
LOCAL KNOWLEDGE: FURTHER ESSAYS IN INTERPRETIVE ANTHROPOLOGY 167, 218, 
230 (1983). 
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even for them these books are likely to be useful, in that they offer a 
richly textured analysis of culture as the driving force behind this 
inevitable legal pluralism.7 And while neither book really tackles the 
ultimate questions of how best to design legal institutions, 
procedural mechanisms, or discursive practices to manage this 
pluralism, they do make it clear that assuming cultural 
considerations out of the equation is simply not an option. This 
insight alone makes these books a welcome addition to the legal 
literature. 
 
*     *     * 
 
In order to discuss two books centered on law and culture, we 
need at least a working approximation of what we (or at least Rosen 
and Chase) mean by the word “culture.” Not surprisingly, defining 
“culture” is a complicated task. Indeed, scholars have long wrestled 
with this definitional question, and there is no necessary agreement 
on what the term encompasses.8 Yet, both Rosen and Chase appear 
to adopt a relatively similar understanding. In their view culture is 
far more than items of culture as understood in common vernacular, 
for example when we talk about “arts and culture.” Thus, culture is 
not limited to film, theater, clothing, and exotic rituals and customs. 
Instead, culture is seen as an entire cosmology. In Rosen’s terms, 
culture is the “capacity for creating the categories of our experience” 
(Rosen, p. 4). From this more expansive perspective, culture can be 
understood first to be the glue that binds together the various 
domains of human life: economics, kinship, politics, and law. (Id.) 
Second, culture is the force that causes the collective experience of a 
group to be “not only logical and obvious but immanent and natural.” 
(Id.) Thus, culture is the way in which “we create our experience, 
knit together disparate ideas and actions, and in the process 
fabricate a world of meaning that appears to us as real.” (Id.) Using 
this definition of culture, we can more easily see its inextricable 
linkage with law as part of the process of meaning-making. 
 
*     *     * 
 
 
 7. See, e.g., Paul Schiff Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 
1155 (2007); Sally Engle Merry, Legal Pluralism, 22 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 869 (1988). 
There is, of course, an increasingly rich literature on legal pluralism in the 
international and transnational arena. See Berman, supra, at 1157-59 nn. 2-7 and 
accompanying text (summarizing literature). 
 8. See, e.g., RAYMOND WILLIAMS, KEYWORDS: A VOCABULARY OF CULTURE AND 
SOCIETY 87 (rev. ed., Oxford Univ. Press, 1983) (noting that “[c]ulture is one of the 
two or three most complicated words in the English language”). 
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Having established a working understanding of culture, we are 
now better positioned to appreciate the central themes of the two 
books. Turning first to Rosen, Law as Culture functions as an 
elegantly short and clear introduction to, and summation of, some of 
the core concepts that have animated his important body of scholarly 
work. Strolling casually across a range of cultural contexts, Rosen 
looks for certain common issues that he argues all legal systems 
must address. He identifies four in particular. First he emphasizes 
the way in which “social control is fabricated through a mix of 
‘formal’ and ‘informal’ mechanisms” (Rosen, p. 8). Second, he 
considers how “facts are created for purposes of addressing 
differences and rendering the process of determining truth and 
consequences consistent with common sense.” (Id.) Third, he links 
law’s reasoning process with the style of reasoning deployed 
elsewhere in the culture. (Id.) This linkage allows us to see how law 
both reflects and helps construct broader patterns of logic and 
rationality for the community. And finally, Rosen identifies law’s 
role in helping to “create a sense of an orderly universe well beyond 
its role in addressing whatever disputes may arise” (Rosen, pp. 8-9). 
These four attributes of law then provide the organizational 
framework for the book, as Rosen devotes one chapter to each. 
Rosen not only identifies these four roles, but also argues that 
these roles (though of course not the way the roles are played out) 
are common across legal systems (Rosen, p. 8). This turns out to be 
crucial to his project, because he is seeking to steer a course between 
the vain search for universals, on the one hand, and the reification of 
the particular, on the other. Indeed, to the extent that 
anthropologists often seem to insist upon cultural specificity and the 
distinctiveness of individual cultures, Rosen rejects such work as “an 
exercise in butterfly collecting” (Rosen, p. 12). Thus, he is, perhaps 
surprisingly, not interested in cataloging the ways in which culture x 
does things this way and culture y does things that way. Instead, he 
appears to see the anthropologist’s role as one that tries to identify 
common conceptual problems across cultures, problems that are 
addressed in many different ways, but that are nevertheless 
amenable to some universal generalizations. 
It is possible, of course, to quibble with Rosen’s attempted 
middle-ground position between the universal and the particular. 
One might, for example, think that, by seeking to identify common 
conceptual problems across all legal systems, he is imposing a kind 
of conceptual universalism. On this view, what Rosen derides as 
butterfly collecting might actually be a wise acknowledgment that 
not just the answers but the very questions a legal system is asked 
to solve are culturally distinct. 
Nevertheless, it would be difficult to dispute that Rosen’s 
SSRN-ID1409294-15/25/2009 10:11 AM 
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approach yields important insights that are helpful in understanding 
most (even if possibly not all) legal systems. For example, he argues 
persuasively that law encompasses a continuum of formal and 
informal structures and that the seemingly more “official” forms of 
law cannot be understood separately from the broad range of social 
control mechanisms (Rosen, p. 15). Thus, as in Stewart Macaulay’s 
well-known study of American business behavior, even such a 
seemingly legalistic realm as contract law often operates more as a 
way of clarifying expectations and cementing relationships—
particularly among those who see themselves as repeat players—
than as setting the stage for a breach of contract lawsuit.9 Moreover, 
it may be that the fear of losing these relationships functions as a 
much greater potential sanction than the fear of being sued. Thus, 
“[i]n even so ‘legalistic’ an environment as contract law. . .it is the 
full array of social control mechanisms that informs the meaning 
and applicability of the law and the role it plays in the broader 
process of exchange” (Rosen, p. 15). 
Not only must law be seen as encompassing this web of formal 
and informal sanctions, but also, according to Rosen, we need to see 
it in terms of both imposing order and creating flexibility (Rosen, pp. 
22-23). This again is counter to the way we often conceive of law. In 
Rosen’s framework, cultures create a balance between “the order law 
seeks and the open-endedness that life requires to fashion a world 
that. . .gives order and flexibility to individuals and groups alike” 
(Rosen, p. 23). Accordingly, law lives entwined with culture, and we 
need to look at the panoply of formal and informal systems in order 
to see that, as with the contractual relations Macaulay identified, 
dispute resolution is only one part of a larger system that needs to 
create a sense of orderliness, while still preserving options for future 
relations. On this view, even a seemingly inflexible legal command 
such as an eye for an eye may be seen as a “structured limitation on 
potentially escalating violence” and therefore a means of preserving 
future relations (Rosen, p. 22). 
Rosen also argues provocatively about the ways in which law 
creates facts. The verb in that phrase is, of course, crucial, as Rosen 
believes that law does not simply adjudicate pre-existing facts, but 
rather constructs what we understand to be the relevant details of a 
dispute. He notes that, even when there is little dispute about the 
events that have occurred, “something must first be regarded as a 
fact if it is to count as such” (Rosen, pp. 68-69). For example, we may 
think that honesty is best revealed through demeanor, or instead we 
 
 9. Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary 
Study, 28 AM. SOCIO. REV. 55 (1963); see also Stewart Macaulay, Freedom from 
Contract: Solutions in Search of a Problem?, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 777 (updating and 
expanding the analysis). 
SSRN-ID1409294-15/25/2009 10:11 AM 
106 THE AMERI CAN  JOU RNA L OF CO MPA RA TIV E LA W  [Vol. 57 
may think it best understood through examining a witness’ kinship 
network. Likewise, someone’s socioeconomic background may be 
deemed relevant to understanding intent or it may be deemed 
irrelevant. And, of course, a legal system may define the boundaries 
of a case broadly or narrowly, to include a whole range of 
interactions among the parties and their families over time, or as a 
completely distinct single act to be adjudicated in isolation from any 
other. 
To explore this idea of fact creation and definition, Rosen tours 
across a broad landscape of U.S., English, Continental, Japanese, 
and Arab case studies past and present. He begins by recounting the 
lengthy history of the development of the English jury, as contrasted 
with the development of fact-finding on the European continent 
(Rosen, pp. 70-88). This history charts how continental and English 
systems responded to the Lateran Council of 1215, which removed 
priests from the administration of ordeals.10 In place of this divine 
intervention, legal systems were forced to create new finders of fact: 
in England, juries; on the continent, judges steeped in the law of the 
Church. A second example for Rosen is the development of legal 
conceptions of probability in the seventeenth century. Here he traces 
the ways in which notions of probability evolved “[a]s the Protestant 
Reformation took hold, as science struggled with levels of certainty, 
and as standards for grading moral acts diversified” (Rosen, p. 88). 
Next, Rosen elaborates on his notion of how evidentiary rules reflect 
and reinforce cultural assumptions by describing some of the more 
bizarre facets of American evidence law—for example, are people 
really more likely to tell the truth while dying or while very excited 
than in other contexts?—and then contrasting the U.S. rules with 
the presuppositions underlying Japanese and Arab evidentiary rules 
(Rosen, pp. 94-105). He notes the more rigidly hierarchical nature of 
Japanese society and ties this cultural form to the use of compulsory 
conciliation and apology for resolving legal disputes. As Rosen points 
out, “conciliation forces higher-ranking persons to honor their 
obligations, allows people a clear acknowledgment of their rank, and 
encourages extralegal pressures” (Rosen, p. 97). Turning to Arab 
courts, Rosen points out that because a person is identified largely in 
terms of those with whom he or she has established bonds of 
indebtedness (Rosen, p. 98), it is not surprising that rules of 
relevance are far looser, allowing a judge to take into account a much 
broader set of relationships than would be typical in a U.S. court. As 
Rosen notes, “What an Arab judge deems indispensable a British or 
American judge is cautioned to ignore” (Rosen, p. 100). Finally, 
Rosen turns to the ways in which evidentiary rules reflect 
 
 10. For Rosen’s account of this history, see pp. 79-80. 
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conceptions of the Self, ideas about expertise, and other cultural 
conceptions. For example, because Arab cosmology assumes inner 
states such as intent are discoverable through a person’s 
relationships and external acts, inquiries about past associations 
and social background are deemed relevant (Rosen, p. 110). 
Similarly, local experts who know the social interactions are 
welcomed, while U.S. courts, in contrast, have come increasingly to 
rely on experts possessing institutional stature rather than personal 
connections (Rosen, p. 125). 
In the final two sections of the book, Rosen turns to more 
abstract issues of metaphor and cosmology. He argues, as others 
have,11 that law is steeped in the metaphors we use to understand 
human behavior and interaction (Rosen, pp. 131-39). Further, he 
suggests that cultures have reasoning styles, which also play out in 
legal rules (Rosen, pp. 139-45). Even the very idea of precedent is 
suffused with a conception of time as linear and progressive. As to 
cosmology, Rosen argues for the important role of law in maintaining 
a culture’s experience of the world “as a unified and sensible whole” 
(Rosen, p. 171). Moreover, he goes further and suggests that “the 
predominant point of some legal systems may be the maintenance of 
cosmological sense rather than ‘practical’ dispute resolution” (Rosen, 
p. 175). 
All of this makes for an entertaining introduction to the 
interaction of law and anthropology. Indeed, though none of the 
insights contained here is particularly new to anthropology (and 
Rosen himself has trod similar ground in his previous work),12 this 
book is a lovely and easy-to-read entering point into the variety of 
ways law and culture intermix. As such, its ideal audience is, 
perhaps, lawyers who have a comparative bent but who do not have 
much detailed background on the deep relationship of law and 
culture. 
Even given Rosen’s obvious decision to be a bit more breezy and 
introductory in this book, one could still quibble with just how breezy 
it is. Thus, as discussed above, Rosen frequently generalizes about 
“Arab” legal systems, without providing any differentiation among 
different subsets of “Arab.” Similarly, his various other legal 
classifications—continental systems, common law systems, Japanese 
systems, Cheyenne systems, and so on—have a tendency to feel a bit 
schematic and lacking sufficient nuance. Nevertheless, Rosen offers 
enough detail to make his key points, and of course the breeziness of 
his book is one of its strengths; the book is an easy read, and that is 
 
 11. See, e.g., ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW 
(2000); STEVEN L. WINTER, A CLEARING IN THE FOREST: LAW, LIFE, AND MIND (2001). 
 12. See, e.g., LAWRENCE ROSEN, THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF JUSTICE: LAW AS 
CULTURE IN ISLAMIC SOCIETY (1989). 
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great praise for a work as serious-minded and thoughtful as this. 
 
*     *     * 
 
Oscar Chase’s book is focused less on the general cosmology of 
law than on the specific issue of dispute resolution processes. Yet, 
like Rosen, Chase argues for the deep connection between culture 
and disputing. Moreover, perhaps because Chase is a law professor 
rather than an anthropologist, he takes an additional step and 
attempts to draw normative conclusions from this core observation. 
Thus, he suggests that “[t]he recognition and understanding of this 
relationship [between culture and disputing] will enrich our capacity 
to evaluate recommendations for change—particularly when they 
involve borrowing from other societies” (Chase, p. 2). 
Chase starts, like Rosen, with what some might term a 
“primitive” dispute system; in this case the example is the Azande of 
Central Africa (Chase, pp. 15-29). Here, it is easy to see how dispute 
institutions are culturally embedded and play a role in 
disseminating (and of course shaping) cultural values, beliefs, and 
social arrangements. Next, Chase turns to the dispute resolution 
processes of modern industrialized societies, arguing that here too, 
no less than for the Azande, dispute resolution is a culturally 
inflected process (Chase, pp. 30-46). Indeed, echoing Rosen’s 
argument about fact creation rather than fact discovery, Chase 
contends that rules of law and evidence function like oracles (Chase, 
pp. 39-43). He notes that the application of reason to observable facts 
reflects “methods of science that have dominated Western thought 
since the end of the Middle Ages” (Chase, p. 41). Yet, this seeming 
scientific rationality is undermined in every modern legal system by 
rules that sacrifice accuracy in favor of other cultural values. Thus, 
“[l]egal processes tell the decider how the real must be sorted from 
the false” (Chase, p. 42). 
Having laid this groundwork, Chase then takes a turn that 
differentiates his book from Rosen’s; he draws explicit lessons for law 
reform. Most fundamentally, he argues that “[a]ny proposal to 
borrow procedures from another society should prompt a cultural 
inquiry” (Chase, p. 48). Thus, processes that work in one culture may 
fail elsewhere because the processes may reflect deeply held 
worldviews. This may be particularly true of dispute processes, 
“because they are so public, dramatic, and repetitive.” (Id.) For 
example, the oft-noted American reliance on law may reflect core 
features of American culture more generally. Chase relies on the 
insights of Robert A. Kagan in this regard, arguing that the 
American reliance on law arises from an idealistic culture that 
demands comprehensive solutions to social problems, while at the 
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same time mistrusting government bureaucracy and therefore 
demanding that such solutions be reached through decentralized 
processes.13 The result, for Kagan, is a reliance on litigation. And 
Chase rightly points out that trying to reform this reliance on 
adversarial legalism may not “work” because it is so central to 
culture. 
Of course, observing the tie between law and culture cannot 
fully answer the normative law reform question. This is because law 
and culture operate in a reflexive loop, each influencing the other. 
Accordingly, a change in law may actually change culture over time. 
Thus, a legal reform or transplant from another system may be 
rejected because of lack of cultural fit, but alternatively it may be 
adopted and ultimately come to seem natural, thereby effectuating 
broader cultural shifts. 
Chase explores these interactive transformations of law and 
culture in his explication of the rise of Alternative Dispute 
Resolution (ADR) processes in the United States. One might think 
that given the cultural rationales for adversarial legalism 
summarized above, ADR would have difficulty taking root here. Yet, 
Chase traces the rise of ADR to a confluence of cultural factors: 
“distrust of government, privatization, humanization of large-scale 
institutions, social progress through individual improvement, and 
postmodern skepticism about an objective reality” (Chase, p. 94). 
Thus, ADR is less inexplicable than it might first appear. Moreover, 
in true Mobius Strip fashion, the change in legal landscape 
inevitably feeds back into an altered cultural conception about how 
disputes should be resolved. 
Accordingly, while Chase raises normative questions about legal 
transplantation, it is not clear how such questions actually cash out. 
After all, it is easy to see why transplants will fail if culture is static, 
but in Chase’s conception, as noted above, law changes culture just 
as much as it reflects it. Thus, a transplant could actually effectuate 
cultural change rather than simply being thwarted by cultural 
specificity. 
To be fair, Chase acknowledges this difficulty. Indeed, in his 
conclusion, he explicitly states that a more culturally-sensitive 
analysis will not “necessarily dictate a resolution” of debates about 
transplants (Chase, p. 139). Instead, he urges only that “the 
constructive power of dispute-ways should be on the agenda.” (Id.) As 
such, the outcome of any given transplant discussion, according to 
Chase, “should depend on an estimate of the cultural clash and 
constructive strength of a contemplated new direction and, even 
 
 13. See Chase at 49 (quoting ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE 
AMERICAN WAY OF LAW 15-16 (2001)). 
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more important, the desirability of the value that will be served.” 
(Id.) This is undoubtedly correct as far as it goes, though it is unclear 
exactly how such estimates will be made. In any event, Chase rightly 
concludes that seeking technocratic, purportedly pan-cultural, 
solutions is unlikely to be a successful long-term strategy. And in 
this insight alone Chase advances the discussion a great deal. 
 
*     *     * 
 
Both Rosen and Chase are to be congratulated for ensuring that 
an understanding of the deep ties between law and culture always 
plays a part in our consideration of the interactions among legal 
systems and the melding of legal rules. Such deep ties require, 
among other things, that reformers remain cautious and self-aware. 
Thus, these two books lay the essential groundwork for future 
explorations. 
Such future explorations will undoubtedly need to push even 
further to the core legal process questions of the twenty-first 
century, an era in which both law and culture are likely to become 
increasingly polyglot. As communication technologies, trade, and 
migration blur cultural boundaries and even begin to undermine 
relatively stable ideas about the majority religious, racial, and ethnic 
groupings that comprise a state, law will face greater pressure to 
incorporate foreign cultural practices. Yet, at the same time, there 
are bound to be backlashes, as cultures fight fiercely to retain their 
dispute resolution mechanisms and legal cosmology just as surely as 
they resist other perceived encroachments. 
Negotiating this complex interplay between cultural bricolage 
and cultural essentialism is bound to be the crucial question for 
comparative law in this new era. We will need to develop a 
jurisprudence for an increasingly hybrid world where cultural 
conceptions remain crucial, but are in flux.14 In the end neither book 
offers much of a roadmap with regard to this sort of jurisprudence. 
To be fair, this is not Rosen’s project at all, and to the extent Chase 
addresses the question, his analysis is meant to be only an initial 
foray. Thus, these useful books point the way for subsequent 
analyses, even while stopping short of tackling the core future issues 
of law and globalization themselves. 
In the end, both books are readily accessible introductions to the 
cultural analysis of law, and comparative lawyers will find much 
food for thought. And if these books still leave some of the big 
 
 14. For my own preliminary stab at such a jurisprudence, see Berman, supra 
note 8; see also PAUL SCHIFF BERMAN, LAW BEYOND BORDERS: JURISPRUDENCE FOR A 
HYBRID WORLD (forthcoming, Cambridge Univ. Press 2009) (expanding on this idea). 
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questions of legal/cultural change unresolved, we will certainly not 
be able to take the next step without heeding the insights they 
contain. Thus, as we move into a world of increasing legal pluralism 
and hybridity, Rosen and Chase have laid down important markers 
to which we should keep returning as we traverse the uncertain road 
ahead. 
 
